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Abstract 
Information systems outsourcing risks are a vital component in the decision and management process associated to the provision 
of information systems and technology services by a provider to a customer. Although there is a rich literature on information 
systems outsourcing risks, the accumulated knowledge on this area is fragmented. In view of this situation, an argument is put 
forward on the usefulness of having a theory that integrates the various constructs related to information systems outsourcing 
risks. This study aims to contribute towards the synthesis of that theory, by proposing a conceptual scheme for interpreting the 
literature and presenting a preliminary version of a catalog of information systems outsourcing risks. Proposals for subsequent 
work towards the generation of the theory of information systems outsourcing risk are suggested. 
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1. Introduction 
The survivability and prosperity of any organization depends crucially on its capability to perform a set of 
activities that result in the delivery of a valuable product or service for the market. In order to enhance their value 
chain, organizations use various technological and managerial solutions to support their business processes. These 
solutions may be developed internally or procured externally to the organization, configuring the two main ways to 
obtain any type of resources – insourcing and outsourcing. Confronted with fierce competition in the context of 
global economic and financial crises, companies strive for greater efficiency and reduced costs, while at the same 
time try to increase their specialization in a limited number of key areas. This state of affairs may tip organizations to 
the outsourcing side of the sourcing binomial, transforming the outsourcing option in a critical strategic decision [1].  
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In the realm of information systems (IS), outsourcing involves making arrangements with an external party for 
the partial or total provision of the management and operation of an organization’s information technology (IT) 
assets or activities [2]. These arrangements take the form of contracts that state the agreement between two entities: 
the customer of the outsourcing services and the provider (or providers) of those services. 
The relevance of IS outsourcing is evidenced by Gartner’s forecasts of a worldwide market reaching $288 billion 
in 2013 [3] and of a growth rate of 5.2% in 2014 [4]. It may also be appreciated by considering the accumulated 
knowledge produced on the area (cf. [5,6]). 
Prior to embark upon an IS outsourcing project, an organization should ponder the expected costs and benefits of 
the outsourcing option. If the organization decides to proceed with the outsourcing, the consideration of the cost-
benefit relationship should persist, in order to take into account the benefits really achieved and the costs incurred. 
Associated with benefits and costs of an outsourcing deal there is a set of risks. These risks need to be managed if 
the transaction between an outsourcing customer and one or more outsourcing providers is to be successful.  
Various studies have been conducted on IS outsourcing risks, addressing issues such as sources of risks, profiling 
and prioritization of risks, and actions to reduce the impact of risks. To some extent, that collection of works forms a 
fragmented, although extremely valuable, set of contributions. This interpretation motivated us to seek an integrated 
view of IS outsourcing risks. In fact, some authors have already made efforts to that end, such as [7] who extended 
the risk assessment framework used in engineering to analyze IS outsourcing risks, suggesting the need to combine 
risk scenarios, risk factors, consequences and mitigation mechanisms. This paper builds upon that collection of 
studies and integrative efforts. Our goal is to contribute towards the synthesis of a theory of IS outsourcing risk. We 
believe this theory may prove particularly useful to practitioners analyzing the feasibility of an IS outsourcing 
project or steering ongoing IS outsourcing transactions and to researchers deepening our understanding of the IS 
outsourcing risk management process. 
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, a conceptual scheme for interpreting the literature on 
IS outsourcing risks is proposed, followed by the description of the work. Next, a preliminary version of a catalog of 
IS outsourcing risks is presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn and future work is suggested. 
2. Conceptual Scheme 
The aim of this study is to make a contribution in the domain of IS outsourcing that may assist in the near future 
in the creation of a theory of IS outsourcing risk. As formulated, this ultimate objective builds on three main 
concepts: IS outsourcing, theory and risk. As a first step towards that research goal, we will briefly discuss each of 
these three concepts in order to develop a conceptual scheme on which to base the generation of such theory. 
IS outsourcing is not a new phenomenon. Since its emergence in the 60s, it has undergone several changes: from 
an emphasis on time-sharing services, it evolved to the application service provision (ASP) model in the late 90s, 
and then to service-oriented computing (SOC) and on-demand/utility computing in the beginning of this century [8]. 
Also, from a geographical point of view, it has diversified from domestic provision of services by third parties to 
offshore outsourcing, where the responsibility for management and delivery of IT services is located in a different 
country from that of the customer [9]. 
Whether the purpose for outsourcing is the externalization of IT infrastructure, application development, or IS 
management responsibilities, just to name a few, it is possible to conceive IS outsourcing as a process composed of 
two main phases: the decision process and the implementation [5]. The decision process phase encompasses three 
stages, in which organizations weight up the advantages and disadvantages of IS outsourcing, address alternative 
outsourcing arrangements and finally make the decision after comparing the various outsourcing options. The 
implementation phase is organized by [5] in two stages: how and outcome. The ‘how’ stage includes the selection of 
the provider and the customer-provider relationship related activities, namely relationship structuring (contractual 
process), relationship building (strengthening the relationship between customer and provider) and relationship 
management (driving the relationship in the right direction). The ‘outcome’ stage reflects the consequences of the 
outsourcing choice that was made, the degree of success of the arrangement and lessons from the outsourcing. 
The second fundamental concept we review is theory. A theory is a set of defined and interrelated constructs that 
presents a systematic view of phenomena [10]. In order to be considered a theory, a conceptual artifact must identify 
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the constructs that compose it, specify the relationships among these constructs, and be so formulated that these 
relationships are able to be tested, i.e., are falsifiable [11]. 
The importance of theory may be appreciated by considering its primary goals: analysis and description 
(description of the phenomenon of interest and analysis of the relationships among constructs), explanation (how, 
why, and when things happen), prediction (what will happen if certain preconditions hold) and prescription 
(provision of a recipe to the construction of an artifact) [12]. In this study we are interested in the IS outsourcing 
phenomenon from the perspective of risk, our third fundamental concept to discuss. 
Risk is a word with multiple meanings. Recognizing the incoherent use of the concept, [13] identified four main 
conceptions for risk: a dangerous activity (“Where is in the list the risk of flying by plane?”), a probability (“What is 
the annual risk of death at eighty?”), a consequence (“What is the risk of letting the parking meter expire? Answer: 
be fined!”), and a danger or threat associated to an activity or technology (“How big is the risk of smoking cigars?”). 
In the literature it is possible to find these different conceptions of risk. Aubert et al. argue that risk encompasses 
the meaning of negative outcome, such as shortfalls in systems performance, disruption of service to customer, and 
loss in innovative capacity, and the meaning of factors leading to negative outcomes, such as a continuing stream of 
requirement changes or personnel shortfalls, lack of upper management commitment, and business uncertainty [14]. 
Similarly, in ISO 31000 standard is observed that risk is often characterized by reference to potential events, 
consequences, or a combination of these, being often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an 
event and the associated likelihood of occurrence [15]. Willcocks and Lacity view risk as a negative outcome that 
has a known or estimated probability of occurrence [16]. Bahli and Rivard perceive risk as a danger or hazard [7]. 
Lacity et al. define risk as the probability of an action adversely affecting an organization [6]. 
Despite the diversity of meanings of the term risk, Renn isolated a common element among all definitions, 
namely the distinction between reality and possibility [17]. Under this assumption, that author defined risk as the 
possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences that have an impact on what people value [17]. In a 
similar vein, the standard ISO 31000 defines risk as the effect (positive and/or negative) of uncertainty on objectives 
[15]. At this point a distinction between risk and uncertainty is needed. As soon as 1921, Knight contrasted between 
the concepts of uncertainty and risk, noting that the former is present when the likelihood of future events is 
indefinite or incalculable, while the latter is present when future events occur with measurable probability [18]. This 
distinction contributes to correctly place the role of likelihood (probability) in risk related constructs. A final 
important derivation from the conception of risk by [17] is that risks may be conceived as mental representations of 
threats capable of causing losses or as opportunities that can produce gains. This last alternative view of the concept 
of risk is in sharp contrast with the common view that associates risk to hazard. In this study we adopted the former 
view of risk, focusing our attention on the possibility of some unfavorable event or outcome occur in the realm of IS 
outsourcing. Nevertheless, we will address the usefulness of the alternative view of risk for the management of IS 
outsourcing in the conclusion section of this paper. 
Given the aim of this study, the review of literature on the concepts of theory and risk prompted us to develop a 
conceptual scheme that could provide a basis for constructing a theory of IS outsourcing risk, by shaping and 
organizing our interpretation of the findings in IS outsourcing literature. To this end, we propose the conceptual 
scheme illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual Scheme. 
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A danger is a potential cause of a negative outcome; it is not, by itself, a realized damage. A negative outcome is 
an adverse result from which derives an undesirable consequence. An undesirable consequence configures an 
explicit loss to the entity (in this case the organization), in terms of tangible or intangible assets or opportunities to 
reap future benefits. Both dangers and negative outcomes are possibilities that may culminate in undesirable 
consequences. A negative outcome and the originating danger are of interest to an organization due to the 
undesirable consequences that may entail for the organization. Associated with a danger and a negative outcome 
there is a likelihood of occurrence. Different dangers and negative outcomes may present distinct levels of severity. 
In contrast, a factor is an attribute of some entity or situation that increases the exposure of the organization to a 
danger. Contrary to dangers and negative outcomes, at a given time a factor has a well determined non-probabilistic 
value. Finally, a mitigation action consists in an act, usually performed by the entity that may suffer the undesirable 
consequence, expected to lessen the intensity of a negative outcome, eventually nullifying it. 
3. Study Description 
Having defined the conceptual scheme, we proceeded to review literature that explicitly addressed IS outsourcing 
risks. In order to pursue the goal of generating a theory of IS outsourcing risk, it is essential to take into account the 
wealth of studies conducted in the area. Our purpose was to interpret the findings in the literature in light of the 
proposed conceptual scheme. We began by conducting a literature search in the main scientific indexing platforms 
and repositories, such as ISI Web of Knowledge, SCOPUS, Google Scholar, b-on, and AIS Electronic Library. The 
search criteria involved looking for expressions “IS outsourcing”, “IT outsourcing” and “risk” in the title or abstract 
of papers. The results were screened for relevance, yielding a list of 33 papers. The next step was to characterize the 
IS outsourcing risks discussed in those studies. For that matter, we built a repository of IS outsourcing risk related 
elements. These elements were diverse in nature, including issues such as risk factors, risks, consequences, adverse 
events, risk mitigation mechanisms, risk management strategies, risk management practices, and risk profiles. From 
this recollection exercise we got 727 risk related elements (corresponding to an average of 22 risk elements per 
paper, with a minimum of 1 element and a maximum of 131 elements). To make sense of this set of issues we 
classified them according to the constructs found on our conceptual scheme. In addition, we also classified each 
issue according to the party involved, namely IS outsourcing customer or IS outsourcing provider. Given the 
preponderance of issues related to the customer side (693 risk related elements) to those regarding the provider side 
(34 risk related elements), for this study we concentrated our analysis on the former. 
After classifying the issues, we aggregated them, by condensing issues presenting similar formulations. Special 
care was placed in the naming of the condensed issue, in order to remain faithful to the ideas underlying the original 
formulations and to minimize phrasing ambiguity. Besides the classification of each risk element, we also 
characterized them. For that end, we located each of the condensed issues in the IS outsourcing process, by asking 
the following questions in accordance to the construct category under examination: “When is this undesirable 
consequence felt more strongly?”, “At what stages this negative outcome may result?”, “At what stages this danger 
can be experienced more severely?”, “At what stages this factor has its major impact?” and “When does this 
mitigation action take place?”. For the undesirable consequences we used the following scale: pre-contract (Pre), 
execution of the contract (Exec) and post-contract (Post). For the other four constructs we resorted to [5] stage 
framework, locating the risk elements in the following IS outsourcing stages: Decision (D), Provider Selection (PS), 
Relationship Structuring (RS), Relationship Building (RB), Relationship Management (RM) and Outcomes (O). 
The nature of the risk elements was also considered by identifying for each undesirable consequence the 
corresponding type of loss and for each negative outcome, danger, factor and mitigation action their respective foci, 
i.e., the target object of the element. For each negative outcome and factor we also determined their loci – for the 
negative outcomes according to the emphasis of the risk element, and for the factors if they concerned the customer 
(Cust), the provider (Prov) or the transaction (Tran) that takes place between those two parties. 
From this classification and characterization process resulted an artifact in the form of a catalog of IS outsourcing 
risks from the customer point of view which is presented in the next section. 
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4. Catalog of Information Systems Outsourcing Risks 
The undesirable consequences for the IS outsourcing customer condensed from literature are shown in Table 1. 
Of the 17 issues, the loss of critical skills and competences by the customer on the domain of the services outsourced 
is the most referenced (14 authors), followed by unexpected transition costs of IS services and loss of control over IS 
decisions. The type of loss most often cited is financial, usually expressing situations where the customer incurs 
additional costs not expected or not anticipated. The group of undesirable consequences concentrates on the 
execution phase of the contract and on the post-contract phase. 
     Table 1. Customer-Side Undesirable Consequences. 
Phase Type of 
Loss 
Item Authors 
Pre Exec Post 
   Capability Loss of capability to change [19] 
   Capability Loss of in-house critical skills and competencies on the domain of 
the services outsourced 
[6,14,16,19,20,21,22,23, 
24,25,26,27,28,29] 
   Capability Loss of IS innovative capacity [30] 
   Financial Additional financial costs [21,22,23,31] 
   Financial Costs of services outsourced higher than planned [14,32] 
   Financial Excessive switching costs [21,22,23,27,33] 
   Financial Excessive transaction costs [6,19,22,32] 
   Financial High costs of locating providers and communication infrastructure [32] 
   Financial Loss in future revenue [23] 
   Financial No overall cost savings [6] 
   Financial Unexpected transition costs of IS services [6,7,14,21,22,23,27,34] 
   Financial Unwinding equity to cancel outsourcing contract [22] 
   Image Negative impact on image of organization [19,21,35] 
   Internal control Loss of control over IS decisions [6,19,20,21,22,23,26,32] 
   Internal control Loss of control over services outsourced data [6,19,21,22,23,26,32] 
   Morale Negative impact on employees’ morale [35,36] 
   Strategic Loss of strategic alignment between business and IT [20] 
 
Table 2 groups the issues classified as negative outcomes. The most reported negative outcome relates to the 
general nature of the previous discussed financial undesirable consequences, namely the failure by the customer 
team responsible for the governance of the transaction to consider all the costs associated with the provision of IS 
outsourcing services. Of all 44 issues, 59% were classified in the Service category, with the outcomes regarding non-
delivery or delayed delivery of services, unsatisfactory quality of services and security breaches in services 
concentrating the largest number of references. The second most represented category is Organizational, which 
includes the second most cited negative outcome, namely Provider lock-in. As it might be expected, the outsourcing 
stage that by far brings together more aspects is Outcomes (38 in 44). The stages Decision and Relationship Building 
have no issues, suggesting the need for more research on the adverse results that an organization may face during the 
crucial periods of deciding on outsourcing and laying the foundations for a smooth relationship with the provider. 
Table 2. Customer-Side Negative Outcomes. 
Stage 
Locus Focus Item Authors 
D PS RS RB RM O 
      Contract Changeability Inflexible outsourcing contracts regarding 
changes 
[37] 
      Contract Financial Contractual amendments in favor of provider [7,14,23,37] 
      Contract Financial Uncontrollable outsourcing contract growth [6,21,26] 
      Organizational Governance Failure to assess all provider search costs [27] 
      Organizational Governance Failure to consider all outsourcing costs [6,19,21,23,24, 
25,26,28,30,35] 
      Organizational Learning Lack of organizational learning about the 
capabilities of the services outsourced 
[30] 
      Organizational Strategy Excessive dependence on the provider [19,22,24,25] 
      Organizational Strategy Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision [21,24,25,26] 
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      Organizational Strategy IT becomes undifferentiated commodity [37] 
      Organizational Strategy Provider lock-in [6,7,14,22,23,26,28] 
      Personnel Conflicts Conflicts between users of the services 
outsourced 
[38] 
      Personnel Impact Large number of users affected by outsourcing [22,38] 
      Relational Accountability Unaccountability of actions performed in the 
realm of the services outsourced 
[37] 
      Relational Dispute 
resolution 
Involvement in the resolution of issues between 
the prime provider and its subcontractors 
[22] 
      Relational Infringement Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights [6,20,32,36,37,39] 
      Relational Litigation Disputes and litigation over the services 
outsourced 
[7,14,21,23,32] 
      Relational Ownership Undefined ownership of outsourced data [37] 
      Relational Withdrawal Disengagement turmoil [22] 
      Service Adaptability Inability to adapt services outsourced to new IT [20,24,27] 
      Service Changeability Inflexible services outsourced regarding 
business change 
[20,37] 
      Service Changeability Inflexible services outsourced regarding 
technological change 
[37] 
      Service Compatibility Incompatible systems, software and procedures [37] 
      Service Functionality Non-delivery or delayed delivery by provider 
of services outsourced 
[23,26,32,36,37,38] 
      Service Functionality Services outsourced do not perfectly fit 
customer’s needs 
[37] 
      Service Functionality Services outsourced wrongly developed [38] 
      Service Integration Lack of integration of customer’s processes and 
outcomes 
[22] 
      Service Integration Lack of services outsourced integration 
between different units of customer 
[22] 
      Service Integration Lack of services outsourced integration 
between regional units of customer 
[22] 
      Service Maintenance Poor maintenance of services outsourced [32,37] 
      Service Performance Slow response time of services outsourced [34,37] 
      Service Performance Underperformance of services outsourced [36,37,38] 
      Service Price Unique needs of customer not met cost-
effectively 
[22] 
      Service Privacy Privacy breach on the services outsourced [6] 
      Service Quality Debasement of services outsourced [19,37,39] 
      Service Quality Unsatisfactory quality of services outsourced [19,22,23,32,36,37] 
      Service Reliability Lack of reliability of services outsourced [23,37] 
      Service Scalability Limited scalability of services outsourced [37] 
      Service Security Disclosure of data handled by services 
outsourced 
[19,37,39] 
      Service Security Lack of awareness regarding location where 
services outsourced data is held 
[37] 
      Service Security Security breach on the services outsourced [6,23,24,34,35,37] 
      Service Security Unauthorized access to services outsourced [37] 
      Service Security Unavailability of services outsourced [23,34,37] 
      Service Security Violation of integrity of data handled by 
services outsourced 
[37] 
      Service Workload Workload below contracted base [22] 
 
The construct with the second largest number of issues is Danger, with a total of 104, as depicted in Table 3. 
Although the range of issues is very broad, three foci stand out: Governance (26 issues), Provider behavior (19 
issues) and Contract (13 issues). This stresses the challenges customers face in terms of directing and managing the 
transaction, the potential hazardous relationship with a third party and the central role of the outsourcing contract as 
the fundamental instrument that structures and ultimately arbitrates the transaction. Concerning the stages of the 
outsourcing process we find a more balanced distribution, although jointly the relational categories gather the largest 
number of references, indicating that part of the negative outcomes may be traced to relational issues. 
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Table 3. Customer-Side Dangers. 
Stage 
Focus Item Authors 
D PS RS RB RM O 
      Capability Difficulty in attracting providers [22] 
      Capability Difficulty in attracting providers to perform small slices of IS 
services 
[22] 
      Capability Inability to respond to changes [19,36] 
      Capability Insufficient knowledge transfer between customer and provider [40] 
      Communication Communication difficulties between customer and provider [6,32,38] 
      Communication Ineffective liaison elements between customer’s managers and 
provider’s IT specialists 
[30] 
      Communication Insufficient interactions across outsourcing team members [35] 
      Communication Logistical complications between customer and provider [38] 
      Communication Miscommunication of services requirements [35] 
      Contract Breach of contract by the provider [6,24,25,26,37] 
      Contract Contract in favor of provider [38] 
      Contract Difficulty in adapting outsourcing contracts in the face of 
business or technical change 
[16,29] 
      Contract Difficulty in changing outsourcing panel of providers [22] 
      Contract Difficulty in reducing costs when lesser volumes of 
outsourced services are required 
[22] 
      Contract Exceeding budget in unit pricing outsourcing contracts [22] 
      Contract Incomplete outsourcing contract [16,29,34,37] 
      Contract Inflexible outsourcing contract [6,34] 
      Contract Lack of competition on outsourcing contract rollovers [22] 
      Contract No reflection of technical costs deflation in outsourcing 
contract 
[19] 
      Contract Obstacles to the use of alternative providers [22] 
      Contract Portion of outsourcing contract price devoted to accommodate 
the volatility of provider’s cost to supply 
[22] 
      Contract Inflexible outsourcing contract terms [27] 
      Culture Poor cultural fit between customer and provider [6] 
      Environment Business uncertainty [23,30] 
      Environment Currency fluctuations [35,41] 
      Environment Environmental disaster [20,39] 
      Environment Geopolitical instability [35,40,41] 
      Environment Legal environment uncertainty [38,42] 
      Governance Awareness of the outsourcing costs incurred only allows to 
correct future behavior, precluding the recoup of past losses 
[22] 
      Governance Differences in methodologies/processes used by distinct 
members of outsourcing provider team 
[35] 
      Governance Difficulty in managing remote teams [6] 
      Governance Failure to specify appropriate measures for service [38] 
      Governance High number of small outsourcing contracts to manage [22] 
      Governance Inability to know state of the outsourcing service [38] 
      Governance Inadequate requirements or strategy for outsourcing [21,38] 
      Governance Inappropriate provider selected [36] 
      Governance Incorrect outsourcing project planning [32] 
      Governance Ineffective coordination between customer and provider [42] 
      Governance Lack of consideration of the merits of internal IT team to 
deliver services in-house 
[27] 
      Governance Lack of establishment of risk/reward sharing of potential 
initiatives between customer and provider 
[22] 
      Governance Loss of track of individual cost drivers [22] 
      Governance Low visibility of outsourcing project processes [35] 
      Governance Misinterpretation over outsourcing scope [22] 
      Governance Outsourcing costs in the control of the provider [22] 
      Governance Overlook of post-outsourcing [27] 
      Governance Poor audit, quality assurance and control of outsourced 
services by customer 
[38] 
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      Governance Poor location of outsourcing contract management 
responsibility 
[22] 
      Governance Poor management of change [35,38] 
      Governance Poor management of users’ expectations [35,38] 
      Governance Poor project management by provider [38] 
      Governance Poor relationship management by provider [16,29] 
      Governance Poor relationship management of multiple providers [22] 
      Governance Unclear outsourcing cost-benefit relationship [24] 
      Governance Unrealistic estimation of schedule and required resources [38] 
      Parties behavior Complacency in customer and/or provider [22] 
      Parties behavior Conflict between customer and provider [19,38] 
      Parties behavior Lack of cooperation between customer and provider [32] 
      Personnel behavior Lack of cooperation by customer IT team [38] 
      Personnel behavior Opposition from internal IT staff [6,25] 
      Power Power asymmetries developing in favor of the provider [6,16,29,34] 
      Privacy Insufficient privacy of data handle by IS services outsourced [37,40] 
      Provider behavior Adversarial relationship between multiple contracted 
providers 
[19,22] 
      Provider behavior Biased portrayal by providers [6,26,34,38] 
      Provider behavior Delivery of outsourced services restricted to core contract 
discarding value-added component 
[22] 
      Provider behavior Encroachment of areas of activity among providers [22] 
      Provider behavior Exploitation of customer’s expertise by provider [34] 
      Provider behavior Lack of motivation of provider to reduce costs [22] 
      Provider behavior Lack of trust on provider [6,23,26] 
      Provider behavior Misplacement of focus on outsourcing service provided (how 
vs. what) 
[30] 
      Provider behavior Monopolistic provider’s behaviors [22] 
      Provider behavior Non-compliance with specified methodologies for developing 
or providing services 
[38] 
      Provider behavior Opportunistic bargaining by provider [19,23,41] 
      Provider behavior Poaching [41] 
      Provider behavior Provider limits its accountability to specification meeting [22] 
      Provider behavior Provider with superior experience takes advantage of 
inexperienced customer 
[22] 
      Provider behavior Shirking (deliberate underperformance by provider while 
claiming full payment) 
[23,41] 
      Provider behavior Too low outsourcing bidding to make a profit [22] 
      Provider behavior Unethical behavior of provider [38] 
      Provider behavior Unexpected subcontracting of IS services outsourced by 
provider 
[19,22,34] 
      Provider behavior Use of hidden subcontractors by provider [37] 
      Provider capability Difficulty in incorporating existing data into outsourcing 
services to provide 
[37] 
      Provider capability Lack of experience of provider [6,30] 
      Provider capability Lack of expertise of provider [6,22,25,30,35,
38] 
      Provider capability Loss of provider’s key employees [38] 
      Provider capability Reduced provider’s teamwork effectiveness [32] 
      Provider capability Underestimation of the resources required to run the 
customer’s systems by provider 
[31] 
      Provider capability Unsuitability of technical methodologies applied by provider [32] 
      Provider 
infrastructure 
Instability of provider’s infrastructure [40] 
      Provider 
infrastructure 
Technological platform of services outsourced restricted to 
vanilla solutions 
[22] 
      Provider 
infrastructure 
Technical problems with telecommunications or infrastructure [22,35] 
      Provider personnel High turnover/burnout of provider’s staff [6,35,40] 
      Provider personnel Unreliability of provider [42] 
      Provider service Insufficient support or maintenance by provider [22,35,37] 
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      Provider service Poor provider service [6] 
      Provider viability Poor provider’s financial stability [6,19,28] 
      Provider viability Provider goes out of business [6,34] 
      Regulatory Non-compliance with regulations [36,37] 
      Requirements Conflicting requirements [38] 
      Requirements Difficulty in negotiating requirements changes [22] 
      Requirements Inconsistent, missing, or incorrect IS requirements for services 
to outsource 
[32] 
      Requirements Requirements instability [38,42] 
      Security Accommodation of services outsourced infrastructure and 
granting access to provider’s staff 
[22] 
      Security IS security issues [25,37,39,40] 
      Uncertainty Endemic uncertainty [30,43] 
 
The fifty five factors that have resulted from the interpretation of the reviewed literature on IS outsourcing risks 
are presented in Table 4. This is the construct category where the issues have distributed more evenly over the six 
outsourcing process stages. Two factors – experience and expertise with IS outsourcing – are present throughout the 
lifecycle of outsourcing, with customer’s expertise being the most cited factor. The majority of the factors (30) have 
locus on the customer, followed by 20 factors related to the transaction and five factors being attributes of the 
provider. Concerning the issues with customer locus, the two major focus categories are Governance (14 factors), 
comprising a set of issues that shapes the perspective customers hold on outsourcing, followed by Capability (11 
factors), as measures of the customer’s skills and competences on IS outsourcing. 
Table 4. Customer-Side Factors. 
Stage 
Locus Focus Item Authors 
D PS RS RB RM O 
      Cust Capability Capability to attract providers [22] 
      Cust Capability Capability to manage outsourcing contract scope changes [40] 
      Cust Capability Capability to measure services outsourced  [21,27,43] 
      Cust Capability Capability to trace accountability in outsourcing services 
outsourced 
[22,44] 
      Cust Capability Change management capability [3,8] 
      Cust Capability Experience with IS outsourcing [16,29,34] 
      Cust Capability Expertise with IS outsourcing [6,21,22,27,30,34 
35,38,42,43,44] 
      Cust Capability Familiarity with international and foreign contract law [35] 
      Cust Capability Reliability of mechanisms to audit and control 
outsourcing service 
[21,27] 
      Cust Capability Sourcing and contracting capability [16,29] 
      Cust Capability Variation of available technical expertise [27] 
      Cust Environment Stability of business and organizational environment [38] 
      Cust Financial Availability of funds [38] 
      Cust Governance Acceptance of standard outsourcing contract arranged by 
provider 
[27] 
      Cust Governance Commitment to outsourcing by customer [38] 
      Cust Governance Complexity of integrating multiple providers [22] 
      Cust Governance Governance capability of outsourcing project [38] 
      Cust Governance Information on outsourcing market [21] 
      Cust Governance Information security policy [27] 
      Cust Governance IT considered an undifferentiated commodity to be 
outsourced 
[6,16,29,34] 
      Cust Governance Outsourcing scope (total vs. selective) [27] 
      Cust Governance Patriotic perception of offshore outsourcing [6] 
      Cust Governance Purpose of outsourcing [16,29] 
      Cust Governance Realism of expectations for outsourcing [16,29,34,38] 
      Cust Governance Requirement for different subcontractors [22] 
      Cust Governance Soundness of outsourcing cost-benefit relationship [25] 
      Cust Governance Top management commitment [27,35] 
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      Cust Personnel Level of internal resistance to outsourcing [19,24,38] 
      Cust Personnel User involvement [35] 
      Cust Strategy Alignment between business strategy and IT [38] 
      Prov Availability Number of available providers [43] 
      Prov Capability Consistency of capabilities between different regional 
providers 
[22] 
      Prov Capability Existence of certification and quality model by provider [21] 
      Prov Capability Qualification of provider’s staff [24,25,38,40] 
      Prov Viability Provider viability [35] 
      Tran Accessibility Physical access to provider's site [22] 
      Tran Communication Language and communications between customer and 
provider 
[35,40] 
      Tran Communication Quality of communications and transmission systems 
between customer and provider 
[41] 
      Tran Complexity Complexity of operations [41] 
      Tran Complexity Interdependence between tasks, business units and 
functions 
[30,42,43] 
      Tran Complexity Interdependence of services and contracts among 
providers 
[22] 
      Tran Complexity Technical complexity of services to outsource [38,42] 
      Tran Contract Contract penalties for non-performance [27] 
      Tran Contract Extension of provider’s rights in outsourcing contract [22] 
      Tran Contract Inclusion of service level agreements in outsourcing 
contract 
[27] 
      Tran Contract Outsourcing contract length [22,27,40] 
      Tran Contract Pricing framework of outsourcing contract [38] 
      Tran Culture Cultural differences between customer and provider [6,19,35,36,40, 
41,42] 
      Tran Governance Agendas of customer and provider [22] 
      Tran Governance Degree of shared accountability between customer and 
provider 
[22] 
      Tran Location Different time zones between customer and provider [35,40] 
      Tran Location Geographic separation between customer and provider [38,41] 
      Tran Regulatory Laws and regulations in provider’s country [27] 
      Tran Size Size of the outsourced service [38,40] 
      Tran Specificity Specificity of assets used by provider to supply 
outsourced services 
[43] 
 
The analysis of the collected works resulted in the consolidation of 127 mitigation actions which are listed in 
Table 5. This is the construct with the largest pool of instances, although no single issue clearly stands out over the 
rest. Yet, the analysis by focus shows a strong incidence of the mitigation actions in governance related practices 
(Transaction Control and Project Management), followed by the Relationship and Capability categories. As it might 
be expected, the stage Outcomes does not contain any issue, highlighting the reasoning that mitigation actions must 
be timely implemented. A note of caution regarding this list is that some of the actions advanced in literature are 
actually goals, instead of specific means that may diminish the severity of negative outcomes. 
Table 5. Customer-Side Mitigation Actions. 
Stage 
Focus Item Authors 
D PS RS RB RM O 
      Capability Develop IS outsourcing expertise [16,22] 
      Capability Develop outsourcing project management capability [29] 
      Capability Ensure customer user-provider liaison capability [34] 
      Capability Resort to external consultant advice [22,29,32] 
      Capability Retain key IS business skills [16,22,29] 
      Capability Retain key IS technical skills [22,29] 
      Change 
management 
Establish change management [32] 
      Commitment Get buy-in from business unit management [22] 
      Commitment Get buy-in from regions [22] 
 Author name / Procedia Technology 00 (2014) 000–000 11 
      Commitment Make senior management sign business case for outsourcing [16] 
      Commitment Provide management focus and time [22] 
      Communication Ensure fit between outsourcing task and communication medium  [32] 
      Communication Monitor communications network link with provider [22] 
      Communication Undertake video conferencing and face-to-face work with provider [32] 
      Contract Negotiate detailed and complete contract [16,34] 
      Contract 
chunkification 
Distribute outsourcing services among providers (horizontal 
chunkification) 
[7,29,41] 
      Contract 
chunkification 
Divide outsourcing work into sequential non-overlapping activities 
(vertical chunkification) 
[7,16,29,41] 
      Contract 
dissemination 
Disseminate contract highlights to entire user community [34] 
      Contract 
interdependence 
Design interdependent contracts between independent providers [22] 
      Contract length Negotiate short-term contracts [24,34] 
      Contract length Preview additional extension option in contract [29] 
      Contract 
termination 
Establish rules and options for contract termination [16,22,34] 
      Contract 
termination 
Prepare for end of contract [22] 
      Contracts portfolio Manage the overall small-scale deals as a portfolio [22] 
      Control Retain control over IS strategy [29] 
      Cost drivers Understand outsourcing transaction cost drivers and corresponding 
market prices 
[22] 
      Cost overruns Minimize costs overruns [22] 
      Cost savings Project cost savings over contract length [29] 
      Culture Establish and ensure shared values when provider wants proﬁt and 
the customer wants to control costs 
[22] 
      Data repository Share outsourcing project data repository [32] 
      Disputes resolution Resort to mediation and arbitration to resolve disputes [7] 
      Documentation Establish standards for service documentation  [32] 
      Feasibility Balance performance requirements for services to outsource with 
capabilities of technology 
[34] 
      Financing options Negotiate with provider financing options for the outsourcing 
contract 
[23] 
      Flexibility Ensure sourcing alternatives in contract [22] 
      Flexibility Include in contract ﬂexibility rights [7,22] 
      Flexibility Retain switching possibilities [29] 
      Flexibility Use performance-based contracting where possible [34] 
      Incentives Include in contract efficiency incentives [30] 
      Infrastructure Ensure asset refreshment at market standards and prices [22] 
      Intellectual  
property rights 
Retain intellectual property rights [29] 
      Justification Analyze outsourcing need before contracting [29] 
      Justification Assess outsourcing ‘soft’ factors, not just price/cost [29] 
      Justification Determine what IT gives business advantage [16] 
      Justification Distinguish between core/non-core business and IT assets and 
activities 
[29] 
[16] 
      Knowledge Ensure full understanding of the nature of the work to be 
outsourced 
[24] 
      Knowledge Ensure understanding of systems and products [16] 
      Knowledge Retain business understanding of services outsourced [29] 
      Knowledge Understand if and how provider earns a profit [34] 
      Maintenance Retain standards maintenance [29] 
      Measurement Establish detailed performance metrics that aggregate to overall 
service metrics 
[22] 
      Measurement Establish performance measures and service-level agreements  [16,29,30,34] 
      Measurement Introduce in contract provision to business contribution 
measurement 
[29] 
      Methodology Avoid non-appropriate development methods [32] 
      Non-competition Include non-compete clause in contract [34] 
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      Ownership Retain ownership of IS assets  [16,29] 
      Parties 
expectations 
Delineate in contract expectations from both customer and provider 
perspectives 
[16,34] 
      Personnel Define personnel policies at the signing of outsourcing contract [30] 
      Power balance Ensure power balance between parties [22] 
      Pricing Avoid time and material contracts [32] 
      Pricing Contract on a market-competitive price and service basis [16] 
      Pricing Forecast against ﬁxed-price limitations such as volume constraints [22] 
      Pricing Negotiate adequate pricing framework with provider [16,22,29] 
      Pricing Stipulate in contract update of resource usage charging after 
customer’s systems become running at the provider’s operating 
environment 
[31] 
      Pricing Unbundle lumped prices to assess cost drivers or benchmark [22] 
      Project 
management 
Direct provider’s efﬁciency [22] 
      Project 
management 
Ensure delivery of accountabilities plus planning and executing 
initiatives 
[22] 
      Project 
management 
Establish clear and comprehensive outsourcing management 
structure  
[29,32] 
      Project 
management 
Establish project management [32] 
      Project 
management 
Perform complete project management of outsourcing transaction [22,23,32,34] 
      Project 
management 
Perform daily contract management [16,29] 
      Provider capability Demand from providers customer references that illustrate 
turnaround cases 
[34] 
      Provider capability Evaluate provider capabilities [32] 
      Provider 
competition 
Maintain ongoing rank of providers panel members based on 
performance 
[22] 
      Provider 
competition 
Promote competitive bidding mechanism between providers [22,29] 
      Provider direction Provide clear directions to the provider [22] 
      Provider quality Select supplier with sound financial position, stable customers, 
proven track reports, and stable strategic partners 
[34] 
      Relationship Communicate with provider [19] 
      Relationship Contract a good foundation for relationship between customer and 
provider 
[29] 
      Relationship Develop a preferred provider relationship to deal with unanticipated 
work over the contract length 
[29] 
      Relationship Expedite outsourcing relationship by using a strategic partner, 
establishing a joint venture or involving a subsidiary 
[32] 
      Relationship Make provider participate in the formulation of design 
specifications  
[23] 
      Relationship Manage relationship [22] 
      Relationship Retain relationship building [16] 
      Relationship Set processes in place to let relationship develop [29] 
      Requirements Balance unique needs and standardization needs in contract [22] 
      Requirements Perform face-to-face requirements analysis  [32] 
      Risk management Ensure risk management is performed in low value contracts [22] 
      Risk sharing Make the provider share the risks [26] 
      Scope Consider opting for selective outsourcing or outsourcing with 
multiple providers 
[24] 
      Scope Consider passing complete outsourcing of projects, except design 
specifications, to provider 
[23] 
      Scope Consider restricting outsourcing to technology implementation [29] 
      Scope Define outsourcing scope [22] 
      Security Consider using virtual private networks for highly sensitive data [34] 
      Security Encrypt data [34] 
      Security Ensure security and disaster recovery at provider [22,29] 
      Security Retain access control in-house [34] 
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      Selection quality Establish multi-disciplinary group for provider selection [29] 
      Selection quality Undertake thorough provider selection process [29] 
      Strategy Consider multiple objectives for outsourcing (economic, technical, 
strategic) 
[29,34] 
      Strategy Design outsourcing project by partitioning  work in tranches [29] 
      Strategy Opt for incremental or parallel implementation [34] 
      Strategy Perform IS capacity planning [22] 
      Strategy Provide strategy and direction for outsourcing decision [22] 
      Strategy Source incrementally [34] 
      Strategy Source to multiple suppliers [7,34] 
      Strategy Stabilize IT applications before outsourcing [16] 
      Subcontracting Establish in contract various rights over the subcontracting (access, 
selection, veto, etc.) 
[22] 
      Subcontracting Require full disclosure and customer approval of all subcontractors [34] 
      Total cost of 
ownership 
Manage total cost of ownership [22] 
      Transaction Manage the contract as well as the entity or equity investment [22] 
      Tran benchmarking Benchmark transaction [22,30] 
      Tran control Apply control mechanisms to the outsourcing transaction [7,22,24,29] 
      Tran control Audit compliance [22] 
      Tran control Audit costs and efﬁciency [22] 
      Tran control Audit internal controls at provider [22] 
      Tran control Audit provider timesheets [22] 
      Tran control Establish monitor and coordination mechanisms [23] 
      Tran control Monitor all providers are operating as an efficient and united front [22] 
      Tran control Monitor transaction [22,34,41] 
      Tran control Perform regular reviews of transaction [16,29,30] 
      Tran control Perform updates of price/service/requirement [29] 
      Tran control Undertake regular provider-business management reviews [16,29] 
      Tran trade-offs Ensure cost-service trade-offs are focused and clear [29] 
      Transition Plan and test transition [34] 
      Work organization Stage work hours with offshore provider [32] 
      Workload Monitor and manage customer’s outsourced workload [22] 
5. Conclusion 
The search for a theory of IS outsourcing risk is a long and difficult endeavor. In this paper we attempted to begin 
attacking that challenge by proposing a conceptual scheme comprising the main constructs of the theory and by 
elaborating a catalog of IS outsourcing risks based on literature. The move towards the generation of that theory 
admits (and requests) many future works. At the conclusion of this study we advance five avenues for research. One 
is to compose a catalog of IS outsourcing risks from the provider’s point of view. This would deal with the other 
party of the outsourcing dyad and allow relating the risk perspectives of the two stakeholders. A second suggestion is 
to complement the constructs danger and negative outcome with a risk profile. Recognizing the operational difficulty 
of adopting an approach that could take into account the contingencies of a specific customer or provider, an 
alternative way to assist in risk profiling might be to assess the possibility of dangers and negative outcomes by 
indexing it to the factors. A third proposal for future research is to conduct a field study in order to assess the 
comprehensiveness of the catalog. This could consist on a retrospective study of a series of IS outsourcing cases in 
the risk sphere. The fourth proposition involves equalizing the granularity of the issues that instantiate each of the 
constructs that make up the catalog. A final suggestion derives from the complementary view of risk as opportunity 
that can produce gains. Adopting this view, where IS outsourcing benefits are conceived as (eventually positive) 
risks, one could extend the theory to encompass the interplay between IS outsourcing dangers and opportunities. 
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